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 1. Introduction 
In 1984, Stewart Myers, one of the leading corporate finance academics, published a paper in the 
Journal of Finance entitled, ‘The Capital Structure Puzzle’. Since then a substantial literature has grown 
up around attempts to resolve that puzzle. Yet, in 1999, despite a very large number of research papers 
Barclay and Smith could published a paper in another leading journal Financial Management, entitled, 
‘The Capital Structure Puzzle: the Evidence Revisited’. Whilst we have a number of plausible theories 
and hypotheses about capital structure the empirical evidence is inconsistent, as the titles of these 
papers suggest. Perhaps a useful summary of the current position is provided by Beattie et al. (2006) 
 
“Despite theoretical developments in recent years, our understanding of corporate capital 
structure remains incomplete.” 
 
This paper summarises the results of a questionnaire survey on corporate capital structure undertaken 
during summer 2007 in the UK and in spring 2008 in Greece. The questionnaire was sent to the Finance 
Directors of a sample of 219 UK firms, drawn largely from the FTSE250 and 300 firms listed on the 
Athens Stock Exchange. The motivation for this research stems from the lack of consistency in the 
empirical results on capital structure to be found in the corporate finance literature. There have been 
only a small number of surveys on the subject in the UK and Europe, unlike the USA where a 
considerable number of surveys have been undertaken and published, and so another comparative 
survey seemed opportune. Given the differences, both economic and institutional, a comparison 
between the UK and Greece might throw up interesting differences. By undertaking our own, original 
survey, we hope to make a modest contribution to the understanding of the capital structure issues. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a brief introduced to the academic theories 
and hypotheses associated with debt-equity choices – capital structure. This is presented as a prelude to 
section 3, which provides a brief review of the empirical evidence on capital structure to be found in the 
corporate finance literature. Section 4 provides information about the sample, and section 5 reports the 
results obtained from the survey and relates those results to the extant theories and hypotheses. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2 Theoretical Considerations 
 
The theoretical work on capital structure begins with the seminal contributions of Modigliani and Miller 
(1958, 1963). In the first paper they posit that, in a perfect capital market without corporate taxes, the 
debt-equity choice is irrelevant in terms of the total value of the firm. As cheaper debt is introduced into 
a firm’s capital structure the weighted average cost of capital would fall were it not for the linear and 
offsetting increase in the cost of equity – the shareholders’ required rate of return. In their theoretical 
model, other things equal, the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) does not depend on the 
proportions of debt and equity used to finance the business and therefore capital structure choices 
cannot affect the total value of the firm. In that sense the debt-equity choice does not matter. 
 
Obviously the assumptions required for a perfect capital market do not hold in the real world and the 
existence of corporate taxes rendered the Modigliani and Miller model a special case. Following a 
lengthy correspondence in the pages of the American Economic Review, Modigliani and Miller revised 
their model in 1963 to include corporate taxes. As a result, they acknowledged the tax shield available to 
firms that use debt. Therefore the debt-equity choice does matter and the financial policy that emerges 
is that firms should gear up as much as possible in order to take advantage of the tax shield and thereby 
increase the total value of the firm. 
 
The caveat that applies to this policy prescription is necessary, of course, because as firms increase 
financial leverage, the probability of financial distress increases in tandem. Therefore the amount of 
debt that any firm can sustain will depend, inter alia, on their line of business and the volatility of the 
cash flows stream that it generates. 
 
This leads to the so-called trade-off model of capital structure whereby the tax benefits of debt are 
balanced against the probability of financial distress and liquidation. As a result of this trade-off of 
benefit with disadvantage, an optimum capital structure exists for firms and financial leverage can 
clearly affect the value of the firm and so capital structure is element of the business that should be 
actively managed. 
 
An alternative model of capital structure is provided by the so-called Pecking Order Hypothesis of Myers 
(1984). In this model firms are hypothesized to have a preference to utilise internally generated funds 
for investment purposes to the extent that this is possible. This preference arises due to the reduced 
transactions costs associated with internally generated funds and the avoidance of increased external 
monitoring associated with external sources of finance. If internal funds are exhausted, but the firm still 
has positive net present value projects available, it will turn to vanilla forms of debt. Once this source is 
exhausted it will then use hybrid forms of debt and only in the last resort will a firm issue new equity.  
 
Given the nature of this pecking order and the stream of potential investment projects that become 
available, this hypothesis does not have any policy prescription associated with it. There is no trade-off 
and therefore no optimum capital structure. In that sense, the trade-off model and the pecking order 
hypothesis represent opposite ends of the theoretical spectrum. 
 
There have been various amendments to these two models, but in essence they remain as the 
cornerstones of the academic literature on capital structure and not much is lost by ignoring the 
refinements that have been posited. However, there two theoretical contributions that do deserve 
mention: these are principal-agent theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and signalling theory (Ross, 
1977). 
 
Principal-agent theory posits potential conflicts of interests between corporate managers and providers 
of finance, which, if allowed to materialize, can lead to agency costs. One way of avoiding agency costs 
and mitigating the potential conflict of interest is to align the interest of corporate insiders and outsiders 
via the compensation contracts and incentives of the former. Allied to this mechanism, insiders can 
signal their alignment with the interests of their investors by taking on financial leverage. The disciplines 
associate with corporate debt, the need to pay interest and repay or re-finance the principal, plus the 
increased possibility of financial distress, force management to eliminate slack and focus on profitability. 
In other words the constraints of corporate debt eliminate the potential for managerial adventurism at 
the expense of investors. 
 
As well as the signalling impact associated with principal-agent considerations, Ross (1977) suggests that 
firms can also signal the capital market via debt issues. One of the elements of signalling theory 
concerns the willingness of a firm’s management to increase financial gearing and thereby signal insider 
information and optimism about the future prospects of the business. Similarly stock re-purchases can 
signal positive information about the cash generating prospects of the firm and the willingness of 
management to return excess capital to shareholders, rather than waste it on negative NPV projects 
(Jensen, 1986).  
 
The strength of signals is an important consideration. For example, an increase in financial gearing is a 
strong signal because it is irreversible (in the short- to medium term) and potentially costly (financial 
distress and subsequent loss of management reputations). Re-purchasing a specific amount of stock via 
(say) a tender offer is a much stronger signal than a plan to re-purchase up to a maximum amount over 
a lengthy period of time. Finally, a decision to re-purchase stock by raising debt would represent a very 
strong signal of very positive inside information about the future prospects of a firm. To be really 
effective signalling theory posits that capital structure events or signals must be unequivocal and 
potentially costly. 
 
3 A Brief Review of the Empirical Evidence  
 
There is a very large empirical literature associated with capital structure and it is impossible to 
summarise all aspects of it in brief here. However, what we intend to do is provide the reader with a 
sense of the inconsistency of the results generated by academic researchers using a variety of research 
methods. It is that inconsistency, of course, that has motivated our own study. 
 
There is a considerable amount of US evidence that is consistent with the pecking order hypothesis, 
starting with the survey by Donaldson (1961) and exemplified by the later surveys of Pinegar and 
Wilbricht (1989) and Graham and Harvey (2001). However, some surveys have reported more mixed 
results with some support for the pecking order hypothesis, but also (inconsistent) evidence of firms 
holding to target gearing ratios, which is more in line with the trade-off model (Scott and Johnson, 1982; 
Norton, 1989). 
 
The mixed results from US survey evidence are mirrored by the European (UK, France, Germany, and 
Netherlands) study of Brounen et al. (2004). They found some evidence for the pecking order 
hypothesis, but even more for the static trade-off model. Another European survey across 16 countries, 
by Bancel and Mittoo (2004), also found substantial evidence for the trade-off model and the idea that 
firms seemed to work towards an optimum or target capital structure. Still In Europe, a survey of Greek 
firms by Daskalakis and Vasiliou (2006) found little evidence for the pecking order, but little also for the 
trade-off model. 
 
One problem associated with these European surveys is the small sample size, particular the cross-
country studies. In contrast, the UK study by Beattie et al. (2006) had a much larger sample of 192 firms 
drawn from the DataStream database. The responses that they obtained also found evidence for both 
the pecking order hypothesis and the trade-off model, which, prima facie, suggests that practitioners 
hold inconsistent views about the determinants of capital structure. However, as Beattie et al. point out, 
as far as respondents are concerned the pecking order hypothesis and the trade-off model are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, even if academics tend to view them in that way. 
 
The survey evidence with respect to signalling and principal-agent theory is also mixed. Signalling 
receives more support than principal-agent theory, but overall the evidence is not completely consistent 
and convincing for either (Beattie et al., 2006; Graham and Harvey, 2001). 
 
Whilst this brief review of the empirical evidence has focused on survey studies, by far the greater 
number of studies have used large sample statistical data and regression analysis to test the various 
capital structure theories. This type of research has also generated an inconsistent set of results with 
competing support found for and against the pecking order hypothesis, the trade-off model, signalling 
and principal-agent theory. For reasons of brevity this type of research is not reviewed here, but a useful 
summary of that evidence can be found in Barclay and Smith (1999). As the title of that paper reveals, 
(The Capital Structure Puzzle: the Evidence Revisited), the evidence from regression studies, as with 
survey studies, is far from conclusive. 
 
 
4 Research Method and Sample 
 
In order to provide the opportunity to compare results with those generated in the US, the 
questionnaire instrument created and used by Graham and Harvey (2001) was taken as a template. The 
100 questions were reduced considerably in number (the Graham and Harvey survey included questions 
about investment appraisal, cost of capital and dividend policy) and edited to suit the UK and Greek 
contexts. The questionnaire was then trialled amongst the finance faculty at Kingston University. 
 A sample of 219 finance directors were then identified by name, with the sample based for the most 
part on the constituent firms of the current FTSE index. Similarly in Greece the finance directors of 100 
firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange were identified. The questionnaire was then sent to the 
named finance directors, together with a covering letter that explained the purpose of the survey and 
also guaranteed respondents complete anonymity. After 3 weeks a follow up letter and another 
questionnaire were sent to non-respondents. In total 83 usable responses were received in the UK, a 
response rate of 37.9%. In Greece 24 replies were received, despite strenuous efforts to induce a 
greater responses: in Greece the final response rate was 24%, although disappointing in terms of actual 
numbers, but not entirely out of line with recent experience of other researchers in the finance field. 
The response rates of to similar surveys are as follows: Graham and Harvey, 2001 with 9%; Bancel and 
Mittoo, 2004 with 12%; and Beattie et al., 2006 with 23%. 
 
Details of the respondent samples are provided in Tables 1, 2, and 3. 
__________________________ 
Tables 1, 2, and 3 about here 
__________________________ 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Trade-off Theory 
 
Table 4 captures the responses to questions and statements about factors associated with the trade-off 
theory of capital structure. In some respects UK responses align with trade-off theory. A large 
proportion of respondents consider the tax shield advantages of debt (Q5a) to be important or very 
important (68.3%) and the mean response (0.80) is significant at the one per cent level.  This a stronger 
result than the results from Graham and Harvey (2001) for the US, the UK results reported by Brounen 
et al. (2006), the UK results of Beattie et al. (2006). In contrast, the tax shield is not a major 
consideration for Greek firms, with only 20.9 per cent rating it as important or very important. This is 
much lower than the Bancel and Mittoo (2004) study that included Greece and similar European 
countries in terms of economic development. 
 In contrast, similar proportions of respondents in both countries rate potential financial distress as a 
moderately important consideration (UK = 47.6%; Greece = 41.7%), but the mean response in both cases 
is not statistically significant. The importance of financial distress in this survey of UK and Greek firms is 
much stronger than other survey results (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; Brounen 
et al., 2006; Beattie et al., 2006). However, there is a slight question mark over the UK result for this 
question when compared with the distribution of responses to Q5c, where only 25.7 per cent consider 
the volatility of earnings (mean = -0.36) to be an important consideration in the choice of debt level. This 
also contrasts with the consistent set of responses in the Greek sample. 
 
__________________________ 
Table 4 about here 
__________________________ 
 
The importance of the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) as a consideration in debt choices (Q6i) 
is important in the UK (57.3% and significant at the one per cent level), but only moderately so for Greek 
firms (45.8%, but not significant). Surprisingly, perhaps, other recent survey referred to above do not 
appear to have asked a direct question about capital structure choices and the WACC.  
 
The cheaper cost of issuing debt (Q5d, Q6f) could be considered to be an element of the trade-off in the 
debt-equity choice and is of consistently high importance in the UK (78% for both questions). However, 
the responses from Greek firms are inconsistent (45.8% and 20.8% respectively). The importance of 
issue costs for the UK reported here is a much stronger result than Graham and Harvey (2001) for the 
US, Brounen et al. (2006) for the UK and Bancel and Mittoo (2004) for Europe. 
 
On the basis of evidence provided in Table 4, there is support for trade-off theory in the UK sample, but 
not in the Greek sample. However, the picture changes somewhat when we consider the responses to 
questions about the setting of targets for capital structure, Table 5. 
 
In the case of the UK firms 59.3 per cent confirm that they have a target for financial leverage, but for 
the most part the target is flexible and might change from time to time. This provides additional support 
for the trade-off theory in the UK. According to the Greek data, 81.8 per cent of firms employ a target 
for capital structure, although, again, the target is flexible and subject to change. This result is somewhat 
puzzling, given the responses to the questions set out in Table 4 above. 
 
__________________________ 
Table 5 about here 
__________________________ 
 
On balance we conclude that the UK results in respect of trade-off theory are broadly in line with 
evidence from the US provided by Graham and Harvey (2001), from the UK results reported by Brounen 
et al. (2006) and Beattie et al. (2006) and also the result reported by Bancel and Mittoo (2004) for 
Europe. In the case of Greece, we conclude that overall our results do not support the trade-off theory; 
although we recognize that the responses in respect of financial leverage targeting are anomalous. 
 
5.2 Pecking Order Hypothesis 
 
Despite the support for the trade-off theory in the UK provided by the data in Tables 4 and 5, the data 
presented in Table 6 provides clear support for the competing pecking order hypothesis. In the case of 
Greece, we find no support for the pecking order hypothesis. 
 
__________________________ 
Table 6 about here 
__________________________ 
 
In the UK there is very strong support for the statement that debt is preferable to issuing equity (Q6c), 
with 80.5 per cent of respondents registering agreement or strong agreement with that statement 
(mean = 1.11, significant at one percent level). When profits are insufficient for investment needs (Q6a), 
debt is clearly preferred to equity, although support is less clear cut (45.1% agree/strongly agree, mean 
= 0.32, significant at the 5 per cent level). However, when asked to support a statement suggesting the 
equity issuance would be avoided whenever possible (Q6e), only 39.0 per cent agree and the mean 
response (0.06) is not different from the neutral choice. There is very strong support (81.7% 
agree/strongly agree) for a preference of straight debt over convertible debt. 
 
In the case of Greece the responses to the same questions produces much lower levels of agreement or 
strong agreement. Only 33.3 per cent agree that when profits are insufficient debt is preferable to 
equity (Q6a) and only 25 per cent register agreement that, other things equal, debt is preferable to 
equity (Q6c) and 20.9 per cent agree that they would avoid equity issues whenever possible. 
 
The results for the UK are similar to those reported by earlier surveys. However, our results provide 
stronger support for the pecking order hypothesis than that reported by Beattie et al. (2006) and by 
Brounen et al. (2006) for the UK. They are also stronger than those reported by Graham and Harvey 
(2001) for the US and Bancel and Mittoo (2004) for 1 European countries. In contrast the lack of 
evidence in favour of the pecking order hypothesis in Greece stands out as an anomaly, particularly in 
the light of the lack of support for the competing trade-off theory reported in the previous section. 
 
5.3 Principal-Agent Theory and Capital Structure 
 
The agency issues associated with capital structure were addressed with four direct questions in the 
survey, although others have indirect implications. The results are reported in Table 7. 
 
__________________________ 
Table 7 about here 
__________________________ 
 
Three questions, Q5l, Q6k, and Q6m, address the purported impact that debt has on management 
discipline and incentives to work hard, effectively and efficiently in shareholder interests (Jensen, 1986). 
The results for both the UK and Greece are negative and very similar – statistical tests for differences in 
means were not significant. The negative signs and low (in some cases very low) level of agreement or 
strong agreement with this group of questions demonstrates a complete rejection of the idea that 
relatively high levels of debt are required to ensure that management works in the best interests of 
shareholders. As Beattie et al. (2006) point out; this is, perhaps, unsurprising: asking corporate 
managers if they need the discipline or constraint of debt in order to maximize shareholder interests is 
unlikely to elicit a positive response.  
 
The one substantial difference between the UK and Greek responses is the level of agreement 
associated with question Q6j, which asked respondents if they would consider raising debt in order to 
engage in a share re-purchase. There was modest support for this proposition from the UK respondents, 
where 46.3 per cent agreed or strongly agreed, whereas this proposition was roundly rejected by the 
Greek respondents, where only 4.2 per cent agreed. This difference was statistically significant at the 
one per cent level according to the parametric t-test, but not significant according to the non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney test and given the nature of the data we tend to rely on the latter test. 
 
Neither the UK nor the Greek responses from this survey provide support for the agency hypotheses 
associated with capital structure. This evidence is broadly consistent with the findings from other recent 
surveys (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; Beattie et al., 2006, Brounen et al., 2006). 
 
5.4 Signalling Hypothesis 
 
As far as the signalling possibilities of capital structure choices are concerned, for the most part there is 
little difference between the responses obtained from both sets of respondents in Greece and the UK. 
As the data in Table 8 show, the questions or statements posed in relation to signalling elicit 
disagreement or lack of importance (as the negative signs show). The proportions of respondents who 
considering signalling considerations important or very important, (or agreement or strong agreement) 
are typically low or very low and the mean values demonstrating lack of importance or disagreement are 
statistically significant in ten cases. 
 
__________________________ 
Table 8 about here 
__________________________ 
 
The exceptions are in the case of the statements about credit rating and the issuance of debt as a signal 
that equity is under-valued. In the former case there is modest support for the idea that credit rating is 
an important consideration in debt-equity choices, though the mean values for both Greece and the UK 
are not significant. 
 
In the case of debt and undervaluation there is little support for the proposition and the level of 
disagreement results in a negative mean which is significant at the one per cent level in the UK. In 
Greece the level of support is also very low, but the mean value is just positive. This is the only question 
or statement that registers a statistically significant difference between the two countries. 
 
These results from our survey are broadly in line with the other recent surveys referred to above 
(Graham and Harvey, 2001; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; Beattie et al., 2006, Brounen et al., 2006). The 
influence of credit rating is tested in three of the other studies and two out of three  (GH and BM) clear 
support, whereas BJK does not. Only BGT poses a similar question to Q6g and Q6h about information 
disclosure (in their case about the limited disclosure of placements). Unlike our questions they find 
strong support, but this might be due to the implicit assumption that they were asking about equity 
placements rather than the difference between information disclosure due to debt versus equity issues 
in one statement and bank relationships in the other. 
 
5.5 Strategic Financial Management and Market Timing Issues 
 
The results for what might be considered strategic financial management concerns and market timing 
issues are presented in Table 9. 
 
Two questions were posed about the use of debt to discourage potential bids from other corporate 
management teams and from private equity funds. In both Greece and the UK there was a very low level 
of support for the strategic use of debt in this way. Furthermore, the mean values for these questions 
were negative and significant at the one per cent level in both Greece and the UK. Nevertheless, the 
mean differences between the two countries were also statistically significant because the rejection of 
these strategic propositions were more emphatic in the UK. These results were consistent with the four 
recent survey studies referred to above (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; Beattie et 
al., 2006, Brounen et al., 2006). 
 
Three other questions, Q5f, Q5g, and Q5k were related to strategic issues: whether financial gearing was 
set in order to match the nature of the business; setting a limit on debt to reassure customers; and 
taking on debt to signal strategic intent  to rival firms (the last two are, of course, at odds and mutually 
exclusive). There was solid support for the relationship between gearing and the line of business in the 
UK with 58.0 per cent rating this as important or very important. There was some support for this 
proposition in Greece, but the difference between the two countries is significant at the one per cent 
level. The other surveys (GH, BM, BJK, and BGT) did not present the proposition in terms of lines of 
business, only whether the leverage levels of other firms influenced the debt-equity choices and there 
was little support for that influence (reviewed above in Table 4). 
 
__________________________ 
Table 9 about here 
__________________________ 
 
In terms of customer and supplier reassurance and signalling strategic intent to rivals, there was very 
little support for these propositions in either Greece or the UK, although there was a statistically 
significant difference between the mean responses in the two countries, due to a stronger rebuttal in 
the UK. These results are broadly in line with the other surveys, although both BJK and BGT find a little 
more support for the reassurance proposition in the UK. 
 
Four propositions were tested in relation to timing the market: Q5i about the influence of the business 
cycle; Q7b about issuing debt when interest rates were low; issuing short-term debt when there were 
expectations of a fall in interest rates; and finally issuing long term debt in order to avoid re-financing 
during difficult economic conditions. There was little support for the business cycle influence in the UK, 
but modest support in Greece and the difference in means between the two countries is significant at 
the 5 per cent level. This was not tested by the other surveys. 
 
The two questions associated with the timing of interest rates received differential support levels in the 
UK and Greece. There was modest support for the issuance of debt when interest rates were low in the 
UK, but much stronger support in Greece and the difference in means was significant at the 5 per cent 
level. GH and BM find modest support for this proposition respectively in their US and European 
surveys. 
 
Issuing short term debt in anticipation of falls in interest rates is rejected resoundingly in the UK, but 
receives a 50 per cent support level in Greece. The difference in mean responses is significant at the one 
per cent level. The same question was posed in three of the previous surveys. GH and BM find modest 
support for this idea in the US and Europe, but BJK report very low support in their results for the UK. 
 
The issuance of long term debt to avoid re-financing difficulties received strong support in both Greece 
and the UK, with mean values for responses significant at the one per cent level, with no significant 
difference in means. Strong support was also reported by BM for Europe, but BJK report very low levels 
of support for the UK, and GH report only modest support for the US.  The matching of debt maturities 
with the expected life of fixed assets received solid support in the UK, but surprisingly very little in 
Greece and the difference in means is significant at the one per cent level. This is even more surprising 
when we observe that all the previous surveys report strong support for this proposition. 
 
Finally we asked if a strategy of borrowing short term would be likely to reduce risk taking in terms of 
investment projects. This was roundly rejected in both Greece and the UK, although the difference in 
means was significant, because of the very much lower level of support in the UK. Very low levels of 
support for this proposition were also reported by the four previous studies. 
 
Overall the support for the strategic use of capital structure in a broader context receives very little 
support. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
The UK evidence for trade-off theory from the current survey is much stronger than that reported by the 
previous studies. There are consistently high levels of support associated with the benefits of tax shields, 
cheaper issue cost of debt and moderately high levels of support for the offsetting costs of financial 
distress. Reducing the WACC via capital structure choices is also considered important and substantial 
number of respondents employ a financial leverage target, albeit a flexible target in most cases. In 
contrast the results for Greece are rather more mixed, particularly in terms of low levels of support for 
the benefits of tax shields. Nevertheless,  the support for a financial leverage target is very strong and 
other aspects of the trade-off model receive modest support.  These results for the UK provide much 
stronger support for the trade-off model than all the recent surveys (GH, BM, BJK, and BGT) whereas the 
results for Greece are broadly in line with prior evidence. 
 
Somewhat paradoxically perhaps, the UK evidence in relation to the pecking order hypothesis is also 
much stronger than prior UK results (BJK and BGT). As BGT point out, respondents to their survey do not 
regard the trade-off model and the pecking order hypothesis as mutually exclusive and so it appears 
that practitioners utilize both models as decision frameworks when considering capital structure 
choices. In the case of Greece, we find little evidence of support for the pecking order hypothesis. This 
is, of course, in line with what one might have expected having reported moderate support for the 
trade-off theory. 
 
The evidence about the principal-agent perspective as applied to capital structure (which could be 
incorporated in a trade-off framework) is almost wholly negative, with respondents rejecting the notion 
that debt is used as a necessary discipline for corporate management teams to work in the best interests 
of their shareholders. As mentioned above, BGT suggest that the way in which questions about 
principal-agent applications addressed to corporate managers have to be framed with great care and it 
could be that our questions were framed in such a way as to increase the likelihood of rejection of this 
perspective. Our findings are broadly in line with recent survey evidence (GH, BM, BJK, and BGT). 
 
Similar to the evidence in respect of agency perspectives, the responses  in respect of signaling 
questions and statements are largely negative, with very low levels of support for the idea that debt-
equity choices convey meaningful (i.e. value) information to the market. These results are also broadly 
in line with recent studies (GH, BM, BJK, and BGT). 
 
Turning now to the strategic dimensions of capital structure management, there is very little evidence to 
suggest that debt-equity choices are affected by or are used to affect the perceptions of rivals, 
customers, or suppliers. Nor was there support for the idea that high levels of financial leverage could 
be used as an effective defense mechanism in the market for corporate control. The results for Greece 
and the UK were similar, but there were statistically significant differences between the two sets of 
responses, but only because the rejection of these ideas was much more pronounced in the UK. Again, 
our evidence is broadly in line with previous survey research (GH, BM, BJK, and BGT). 
 
The evidence in respect of market timing issues is rather mixed in terms of different levels of support in 
the two countries, but in broad terms, there is clear evidence that timing is an important issue for UK 
firms in relation to their choices over debt issuance, the maturity of debt instruments and the matching 
of maturities to the lives of fixed assets. For Greek firms there is some support for the timing 
proposition, but it is less clear cut than the UK evidence.  
 
Overall it appears that both the trade-off model and the packing order hypothesis are used by firms to 
guide their decisions over capital structure issues. This contradicts the standard or orthodox academic 
view that they are mutually exclusive perspectives or models. This received wisdom is based on the idea 
that the two models provide for very different predictions about what we should expect to observe 
empirically about financial leverage. It could be that the employment of fairly flexible targets for 
financial gearing accounts for this discrepancy between theory and practice. We also conclude that the 
more sophisticated the theoretical perspectives on capital structure, less purchase it is likely to have on 
reality or practice. Agency perspectives, signaling and strategic motivations are all roundly rejected by 
the respondents in our survey, as they have been to a greater or lesser extent in the other recent 
questionnaire survey referred to above. Perhaps it is time for theorists to focus on more simple 
perspectives, rather than continue to pursue more and more complicated and sophisticated 
explanations that seem increasingly at odds with the evidence evinced by practitioners. 
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Table 1 
Distribution of respondents by sector and by country 
 
 
Sector GREECE UK 
 No. % Responses No. % Responses 
 
 
Retail and Services 4 17.4% 15 18.5% 
Manufacturing 14 60.9% 12 14.8% 
Communications and Media 1 4.3% 7 8.6% 
Construction 3 13.0% 4 4.9% 
Technology -  5 6.2% 
Transportation -  4 4.9% 
Financial Services 1 4.3% 22 27.2% 
Other -  22 27.2% 
 
 
 
Table  2 
Status of Respondents 
 
 
 GREECE UK 
 
 No. % Responses No. % Responses 
 
 
Finance Director (CFO) 11 45.8% 52 64.2% 
Financial Manager (Treasurer, etc.) 8  33.3% 11 13.6% 
Other senior manager 5 20.8% 16 19.8% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3  
Capital structure history of firms in the survey 
 
 
 GREECE UK 
 
 No. % Responses No. % Responses 
 
 
During the past 5 years the firm has: 
 
Issued any combination of equity,  
short and long term debt, convertibles 8 33.3 43 53.1 
Only issued equity 2 8.3 8 9.9 
Only issued long term debt 5 20.8 21 25.9 
Only issued short term debt 3 12.5 11 13.6 
Only issued convertible debt 2 8.3 1 1.3 
Did not issue any securities 4 16.7 9 11.1 
 
Most likely use of funds raised via equity would be: 
 
Retain as cash 2 8.3 3 3.7 
Invest more 18 75.0 10 12.7  
Merger or acquisition 9 37.5 40 49.4 
Repay debt 10 41.7 8 9.9 
Other 
 
Most likely use of funds raised via equity would be: 
 
Retain as cash 6 25.0 4 4.9 
Invest more 20 83.3 38 46.9 
Merger or acquisition 5 20.8 48 59.3 
Repay debt 1 4.2 20 24.7 
Other - - 13 16.0 
 
 
 
  
Table 4   
Responses to Questions Associated with Trade-off Theory. Mean responses based on Likert Scale Responses from -2 to +2 and % of responses 
rated very important or important. Differences in means of UK and Greek samples tested with standard t-test and Mann-Whitney non-
parametric test 
 UK % Greece % Mean t-test MWU MWU 
 Mean important Mean important Difference p-value p-value 
 
 
 
How important is factor X in debt-equity choices? or To what extent do you agree-disagree with statement? 
 
Q5a Tax shield provided by debt 0.80*** 68.3% -0.26 20.9% 1.063 0.000 -4.306 0.000 
Q5b Potential costs of financial distress 0.12 47.6% 0.39 41.7% -0.268 0.302 -0.583 0.560 
Q5c Volatility of earnings -0.36*** 25.7% 0.27 41.7% -0.631 0.022 -2.245 0.025 
Q5d Cheaper cost of issuing debt compared to equity 1.01*** 78.0% 0.26 45.8% 0.751 0.007 -2.968 0.003
  
Q6f Debt preferred to equity because of lower issue costs 0.86*** 78.0% -0.13 20.8% 0.995 0.000 -4.407 0.002 
Q6i Debt level chosen to minimise WACC 0.54*** 57.3% 0.35 45.8% 0.195 0.399 -0.901 0.000 
 
*, **, ***
 denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and one per cent levels. UK and Greek means tested via t-test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov non-parametric 
test under assumption of normal and uniform distributions. Both parametric and non-parametric tests produce the same levels of statistical significance for 
each question. MWU= Mann-Whitney U test statistic. 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Responses to Questions and Statements about Target Setting 
 
 
Sector GREECE UK 
 
 No. % Responses No. % Responses 
 
 
Does you have a leverage target? 18 81.8% 48 59.3% 
 
Strict Target with narrow range 5 26.3% 8 9.9%  
Strict target with broad range 2 10.5% 13 16.0% 
Flexible target with substantial 5 26.3% 12 14.8% 
Very loose target 2 10.5% 7 8.6% 
Target but changes from time to time 4 21.1% 14 17.3% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6   
Responses to Questions Associated with Pecking Order Hypothesis. Mean responses based on Likert Scale Responses from -2 to +2 and % of 
responses rated very important or important. Differences in means of UK and Greek samples tested with standard t-test and Mann-Whitney 
non-parametric test 
 UK % Greece % Mean t-test  
 MWU 
 Mean important Mean important Difference p-value MWU
 p-value 
 
 
 
How important is factor X in debt-equity choices? or To what extent do you agree-disagree with statement? 
 
Q6a When profits insufficient for investment debt is preferable   
to equity issue 0.32** 45.1% 0.04 33.3% 0.278 0.270 -1.365 0.000 
Q6b Other things equal, straight debt is preferable to convertible 1.19*** 81.7% 0.39* 50.0% 0.794 0.001 -3.577 0.000 
Q6c Other things equal raising debt is preferable to raising equity 1.11*** 80.5% -0.48** 25.0% 1.589 0.000 -5.715 0.003 
Q6d Preference for debt due to close relationship with bank(s) -0.95*** 8.5% -0.22 25.0% -0.733 0.003 -3.000 0.504 
Q6e Would want to avoid issuing equity whenever possible 0.06 39.0% -0.13 20.9% 0.192 0.426 -0.668 0.000 
Q6n When profits are insufficient for investment, better to delay  
 than issue new securities    -0.57*** 20.8% -0.39 20.9% -0.177 0.521 -0.749 0.066 
 
*, **, ***
 denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and one per cent levels. UK and Greek means tested via t-test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov non-parametric 
test under assumption of normal and uniform distributions. Both parametric and non-parametric tests produce the same levels of statistical significance for 
each question. MWU= Mann-Whitney U test statistic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Responses to Questions Associated with Principal-Agent Theory. Mean responses based on Likert Scale Responses from -2 to +2 and % of 
responses rated very important or important. Differences in means of UK and Greek samples tested with standard t-test and Mann-Whitney 
non-parametric test 
 UK % Greece % Mean t-test  
 MWU 
 Mean important Mean important Difference p-value MWU
 p-value 
 
 
How important is factor X in debt-equity choices? or To what extent do you agree-disagree with statement? 
 
Q5l High level of debt as an incentive to senior management to  
 work hard to be efficient and effective -1.22*** 6.1% -0.87*** 0.0% -0.353 0.104 -1.952 0.051 
Q6j Willing to raise debt to finance share re-purchase 0.25* 46.3% -1.30*** 4.2% 1.551 0.000 -5.148 0.236 
Q6k High debt level is a good discipline to ensure that senior 
 management maximises shareholder value -0.22* 29.3% -0.48* 16.7% 0.256 0.328 -1.186 0.449 
Q6m High debt level is a necessary discipline to ensure senior    
 management maximises shareholder value    -0.72 13.4% -0.82*** 4.2% 0.102 0.619 -0.344 0.454 
 
*, **, ***
 denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and one per cent levels. UK and Greek means tested via t-test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov non-parametric 
test under assumption of normal and uniform distributions. Both parametric and non-parametric tests produce the same levels of statistical significance for 
each question. MWU= Mann-Whitney U test statistic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Responses to Questions Associated with the Signalling Hypothesis. Mean responses based on Likert Scale Responses from -2 to +2 and % of 
responses rated very important or important. Differences in means of UK and Greek samples tested with standard t-test and Mann-Whitney 
non-parametric test 
 UK % Greece % Mean t-test  
 MWU 
 Mean important Mean important Difference p-value MWU
 p-value 
 
 
 
How important is factor X in debt-equity choices? or To what extent do you agree-disagree with statement? 
 
Q5h Debt-equity of other firms in our industry  -0.25** 24.4% -0.30 29.2% 0.054 0.835 -0.185 0.853 
Q5n Debt issue signals confidence about future earnings growth -0.78*** 11.0% -0.78*** 12.5% -0.005 0.984 -0.192 0.848 
Q5o Credit rating 0.22 47.6% 0.14 41.7% 0.086 0.797 -0.358 0.720 
Q6g Debt preferred to equity due to lower information disclosure -1.06*** 3.7% -0.36* 16.7% -0.698 0.001 -3.084 0.035 
Q6h Bank debt preferred to bond issue due to lower information    
 disclosure -0.88*** 12.2% -0.43** 16.7% -0.442 0.060 -2.114 0.368 
Q6l Other things equal, a debt issue signals insider belief that   
 the firm is undervalued   -0.67***  11.0% -0.87*** 4.2% 0.203 0.380 -0.758 0.731 
Q7a We use debt if we consider that the firm is undervalued -0.41*** 15.8% 0.05 20.9% -0.455 0.035 -1.836 0.066 
 
*, **, ***
 denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and one per cent levels. UK and Greek means tested via t-test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov non-parametric 
test under assumption of normal and uniform distributions. Both parametric and non-parametric tests produce the same levels of statistical significance for 
each question. MWU= Mann-Whitney U test statistic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 
Responses to Questions Associated with Strategic Financial Management and Market Timing Issues. Mean responses based on Likert Scale 
Responses from -2 to +2 and % of responses rated very important or important. Differences in means of UK and Greek samples tested with 
standard t-test and Mann-Whitney non-parametric test 
 
 UK % Greece % Mean t-test  
 MWU 
 Mean important Mean important Difference p-value MWU
 p-value 
 
 
 
How important is factor X in debt-equity choices? or To what extent do you agree-disagree with statement? 
 
Q5e Debt levels to discourage potential bidders -1.21*** 6.1% -0.68*** 12.5% -0.528 0.021 -2.234 0.025 
Q5f The nature of the lines of business 0.74*** 58.0% 0.08 29.2% 0.657 0.008 -2.694 0.007 
Q5g Limitation of debt to show financial strength to suppliers   
 and customers -0.74*** 12.2% -0.26 25.0% -0.480 0.064 -1.835 0.066 
Q5i The stage of the business cycle -0.06 28.1% 0.36* 41.6% -0.425 0.069 -1.858 0.063 
Q5k Debt issues signal to rivals an unwillingness to reduce   
 capacity -1.38*** 3.7% -0.61** 20.8% -0.774 0.006 -3.042 0.002 
Q5m Debt level to discourage interest of private equity firms -1.28*** 4.9% -1.14*** 4.2% -0.148 0.484 -0.809 0.419 
Q7b Issue debt when interest rates are low 0.14 37.8% 0.65*** 58.3% -0.516 0.030 -2.171 0.030 
Q7c Issue short term debt if we think interest rates will fall -0.52*** 13.5% 0.52** 50.0% -1.040 0.000 -4.112 0.000 
Q7d Match debt maturity to the life of fixed assets 0.27** 47.5% -0.43** 16.7% 0.706 0.002 -2.775 0.006 
Q7e Borrowing short term reduces risk of investment projects -0.96*** 4.9% -0.39** 12.5% -0.572 0.007 -2.684 0.007 
Q7f Issue long term debt to minimise risk of refinancing in  
 difficult economic conditions 0.63*** 59.7% 0.65*** 62.5% -0.023 0.914 -0.163 0.870 
 
*, **, ***
 denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and one per cent levels. UK and Greek means tested via t-test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov non-parametric 
test under assumption of normal and uniform distributions. Both parametric and non-parametric tests produce the same levels of statistical significance for 
each question. MWU= Mann-Whitney U test statistic. 
